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Abstract
This paper explores how the specification of the earnings function impacts the opti-
mal tax treatment of human capital. If education is complementary to labor effort,
education should be subsidized to offset tax distortions on labor supply. However,
if most of the education is enjoyed by high ability households, education should be
taxed in order to redistribute resources to the poor. The paper identifies the exact
conditions under which these two effects cancel and education should be neither
taxed nor subsidized. In particular, with non-linear tax instruments, education
should be weakly separable from labor and ability in the earnings function. With
linear taxes, education should also feature a constant elasticity in a weakly separa-
ble earnings function.
Key-words: optimal linear and non-linear taxation, optimal education subsidies,
human capital, earnings function
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1 Introduction
Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) extend optimal tax models with endogenous skill formation.
They find that redistributive governments should employ education subsidies to offset tax
distortions on skill formation in order to ensure efficiency in human capital investment.
Education is neither taxed nor subsidized on a net basis in the optimum. This result
holds for both linear and non-linear tax instruments if the government can verify all
educational investments.
This paper demonstrates that these efficiency results critically hinge on the presumed
specification of the earnings function. In particular, non-linear taxes on education are
zero only if the earnings function is weakly separable between ability and labor effort,
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on the one hand, and education, on the other hand. Under this condition, the positive
efficiency effect on work effort of subsidizing education exactly offsets the negative equity
effect of doing so. Accordingly, education is neither subsidized nor taxed on a net basis
in the optimum. Education should optimally be subsidized (on a net basis) for efficiency
reasons if education is complementary to labor supply; by acting as an implicit subsidy on
work effort, education subsidies alleviate the distortions of a redistributive labor tax on
work. However, education should be taxed for equity reasons if education increases with
ability. If education is complementary to both work effort and ability, efficiency gains
and equity losses of education subsidies work in opposite directions. Education should be
subsidized only if education is more complementary with work effort than with ability.
In that case, the efficiency gains on account of lower tax distortions on labor supply
produced by education subsidies outweigh the distributional losses resulting from the
regressive incidence of these education subsidies. If education is weakly separable from
ability and labor in the earnings function, both effects exactly cancel so that education
is optimally neither subsidized nor taxed.
With linear policy instruments, we show that a separable earnings function should
also feature a constant elasticity in education to ensure that optimal net taxes on human
capital investments are zero.1 With this specific earnings function, labor income and
educational investments for agents with different skill levels are related in a linear fashion.
As a direct consequence, education taxes and income taxes yield the same distributional
consequences and produce the same distortions on labor supply. In contrast to labor
taxes, however, education taxes distort not only labor supply but also human capital
formation. Hence, compared to labor taxes, education taxes produce more distortions
in arriving at the same distributional impact. Redistributive governments should thus
employ only labor taxes, and should set education taxes to zero.
Whether education should be taxed or subsidized on a net basis in an optimal re-
distributive program thus crucially depends on two factors, namely, first, the degree of
complementarity between education and work effort, and, second, the incidence of edu-
cation subsidies on various skill levels. Education subsidies become more efficient to fight
income-tax distortions on labor supply if education and work are highly complementary.
Empirically, education and labor effort are complements because better-educated workers
exhibit larger participation rates, retire later and work more hours (OECD, 2006).2 At the
same time, however, education subsidies are regressive, in view of the well-documented
ability bias in education (Card, 1999). Which of the two factors is more important for the
setting of optimal taxes and education policies thus remains an open empirical question.
The public finance literature on education and taxation typically adopts earnings
functions that satisfy the weak separability and constant elasticity requirements.3 Mal-
1Our model considers only one input invested in education. However, if there are multiple inputs in
the human capital production function (e.g. time, goods and/or effort), the production function needs
to be homothetic in these inputs (see Bovenberg and Jacobs, 2005).
2The correlation between labor supply and education may not be causal. A higher ability, for example,
may boost both education and labor supply. The empirical literature on education and labor supply
(e.g. Card, 1999), however, shows that the returns to education continue to be substantial if one corrects
for ability bias while labor supply does respond to exogenous variations in wages (e.g. Blundell and
MaCurdy, 1999). Education thus does raise labor supply.
3See, for example, Nielsen and Sorensen (1997), Brett and Weymark (2003), Wigger (2004), Jacobs
(2005, 2007), Jacobs and Bovenberg (2005), Richter (2006), Blumkin and Sadka (2007), Bohacek and
Kapicka (2007), and others. Separability of human capital and labor in labor earnings is also adopted
in classical papers on life-cycle models with education; see, for example, Heckman (1976), Kotlikoff and
Summers (1979), and Eaton and Rosen (1980); or in modern articles on growth with endogenous human
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donado (2007), however, employs an earnings function in which ability and labor effort
are not necessarily separable from education. We generalize and interpret his findings
by employing more general earnings functions. Ulph (1977) and Hare and Ulph (1979)
were not able to obtain clear-cut interpretations of optimal tax and education policies for
general earnings functions. This paper, in contrast, provides intuitive characterizations
of optimal non-linear tax and education policies for general specifications of earnings
functions.
Our findings are also relevant for the ‘new public finance’ literature. For example,
Grochulski and Piskorsi (2006) and Da Costa and Mestri (2007) adopt a similar earn-
ings function as Maldonado (2007), but concentrate mainly on the desirability of capital
income and wealth taxes. In particular, Grochulski and Piskorsi (2006) do not optimize
education policy, since education is assumed to be non-verifiable, whereas Da Costa and
Mestri (2007) do not explicitly elaborate on the role of education policy to alleviate the
distortions of the labor income tax. Our paper helps to gain a deeper understanding
about the interaction between optimal tax and education policies in the presence of these
and more complex earnings functions that are adopted in this literature.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 formalizes the model. Subse-
quently, sections 3 and 4 explore optimal education taxes for non-linear and linear policy
instruments, respectively. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
This section briefly summarizes the main features of the model, which extends Bovenberg
and Jacobs (2005) with a more general earnings function. n ∈ [n, n] is individual ability,
f(n) is the density of ability, and F (n) is the cumulative distribution of ability. en denotes
investment in education, ln represents labor effort, cn is consumption and zn stands for
gross labor earnings.
Households exhibit identical utility functions and derive utility from consumption cn
and suffer disutility from work effort ln:
u(cn, ln), uc > 0, ucc < 0, ul < 0, ull < 0, (1)
where subscripts refer to an argument of differentiation (except where it signifies ability
n). This specification generalizes the separable utility function in Bovenberg and Jacobs
(2005).
In addition, we specify a general earnings function. In particular, gross earnings zn
are a function Φ (.) of ability n, education en, and labor effort ln:
zn ≡ Φ(n, ln, en), Φn > 0, Φl > 0, Φll ≤ 0, Φe > 0, Φee < 0, Φne > 0, Φnl > 0.
(2)
Ability, education and labor effort increase earnings. Marginal returns to education di-
minish with the level of education, which ensures an interior solution for human capital
investment. More hours worked raise earnings at a non-increasing rate, i.e. hours worked
may not entail constant returns in earnings as in Mirrlees (1971). Ability is complemen-
tary to both education and work effort: more able workers feature a (weakly) higher
marginal return to both work and education effort. These latter restrictions ensure single
capital, see for example, Jones et al. (1993, 1997), Milesi-Feretti and Rubini (1998), Judd (1999), and
Hendricks (1999).
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crossing of the utility functions under non-linear policies.4 No prior restrictions are im-
posed on the cross derivative Φel. Factor prices are given. We thus abstract from general
equilibrium effects on returns to work effort and education.
3 Optimal non-linear policies
This section analyzes non-linear policy instruments. The government can verify both
gross labor incomes and educational expenditures at the individual level. Accordingly,
the government can levy a non-linear income tax T (zn) on gross incomes zn ≡ Φ(n, ln, en).
The marginal income tax rate is T ′(zn) ≡ dT (zn)/dzn. Furthermore, the government
employs a non-linear subsidy on resources en invested in education. The subsidy is
denoted as S(en), where S
′(en) ≡ dS(en)/den represents the marginal subsidy rate on en.
Education requires only resources and the unit cost of education is normalized to one
for notational convenience. It does not matter whether education requires only resources
or also forgone labor time as long as both time and resources invested in education
are verifiable, and can therefore be subsidized (see Bovenberg and Jacobs, 2005). The
household budget constraint can thus be written as
cn = Φ(n, ln, en)− T (Φ(n, ln, en))− en + S(en). (3)
Utility maximization yields the first-order conditions for the optimal choices of edu-
cational investment and labor supply
(1− T ′ (.)) Φe(n, ln, en) = 1− S ′ (.) , (4)
−ul(cn, ln)
uc(cn, ln)
= (1− T ′ (.))Φl(n, ln, en). (5)
Expression (4) reveals that the net marginal returns to education (the left-hand side)
should be equal to net marginal costs (the right-hand side); taxes reduce net returns while
subsidies reduce costs. Equation (5) indicates that the marginal rate of substitution in
utility between leisure and consumption should equal the net real wage, which is reduced
by a larger marginal tax rate on earnings.
Incentive compatibility requires that each individual n prefers the bundle cn, zn, en
over the bundles intended for all other individuals m:
U(cn, zn, en, n) ≥ U(cm, zm, em, n), ∀m ∈ [n, n],∀n ∈ [n, n], (6)
where U(cn, zn, en, n) ≡ u (cn, ϑ(n, zn, en)) = u(cn, ln). The function ln ≡ ϑ(n, zn, en) is
derived by inverting the gross earnings function zn ≡ Φ(n, ln, en), so that its derivatives
are given by ϑn = −ΦnΦl < 0, ϑz = 1Φl > 0, and ϑe = −ΦeΦl < 0.
These global incentive-compatibility constraints can be replaced by the (first-order)
incentive-compatibility constraint (see, e.g., Mirrlees, 1971)
dun
dn
= ul(cn, ln)ϑn(n, ln, en) = −ul(cn, ln)Φn(n, ln, en)
Φl(n, ln, en)
. (7)
4Single crossing and monotonicity (in the skill level) of gross earnings, consumption and education
are required for second-order incentive compatibility of the non-linear tax and subsidy schedules.
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The government maximizes the following social welfare function, which is concave in
individual utilities: ∫ n
n
Ψ(u (cn, ln))dF (n), Ψ
′ > 0, Ψ′′ ≤ 0, (8)
subject to the economy’s resource constraint5∫ n
n
(Φ(n, ln, en)− en − cn) dF (n) = E, (9)
where E represents the exogenous government revenue requirement.
The Hamiltonian H for maximization of social welfare is given by6
max
{ln,en,un}
H = Ψ(un)f(n) + θnul(cn, ln)Φn(n, ln, en)
Φl(n, ln, en)
+ λ (Φ(n, ln, en)− en − cn − E) f(n),
(10)
where θn denotes the costate variable for the incentive-compatibility constraint (7). λ
stands for the shadow value of the resource constraint (9).7
The optimal net tax on education – when the income tax is optimally set – follows
from the first-order condition for en and is given by (see Appendix)
(T ′ − S ′)
(1− T ′)(1− S ′) =
ucθn/λ
nf(n)
ωn
ωe
∂ ln (Φn/Φl)
∂ ln en
=
ucθn/λ
nf(n)
ωn (ρne − ρle) , (11)
where ωn ≡ ΦnnΦ and ωe ≡ ΦeeΦ denote the shares in gross earnings of, respectively, ability
and education. ρne ≡ ΦneΦΦnΦe represents Hicks’ (1963, 1970) partial elasticity of complemen-
tarity between ability and education. The partial elasticity of complementarity measures
the extent to which ability and education are gross complements in generating earnings
(Bertoletti, 2005). Similarly, ρle ≡ ΦleΦΦlΦe stands for Hicks’ partial elasticity of comple-
mentarity between labor and education.8 θn/λ denotes the marginal value – expressed in
monetary units – of redistributing one unit of income from individuals with ability larger
than n to individuals with ability smaller than n. The more valuable this redistribution
is, the higher will be the net tax (or subsidy) on education (ceteris paribus).9
If education and labor effort are separable in the earnings function (i.e., Φle = 0, so
that ρle = 0), education should be taxed on a net basis for redistributive reasons as long
as education and ability are complementary so that high ability agents exhibit a higher
productivity in learning than low ability agents do (i.e., Φne > 0, so that ρne > 0). If Φne
is larger, then investments in education result in more substantial rents from ability, and
optimal net taxes on education are larger in order to combat inequality (ceteris paribus).
5If all individuals respect their budget constraints, and the economy’s resource constraint is met, the
government budget constraint is automatically satisfied by Walras’ law.
6We assume that the first-order approach is valid and that no bunching occurs due to either binding
non-negativity constraints or the violation of monotonicity conditions.
7The transversality conditions are given by limn→n θn = 0, limn→n θn = 0.
8For classical contributions on the elasticity of complementarity and how it relates to the elasticity
of substitution, see Hicks (1963, 1970) and Samuelson (1947, 1973). More recent contributions include
Broer (2004), Bertoletti (2005), and Blackorby et al. (2007).
9The optimal non-linear income tax at optimal non-linear education subsidies and the expression for
the marginal value of redistribution θn/λ are derived in the appendix. They are virtually the same as in
the optimal tax literature. We refer the reader to Mirrlees (1971), Seade (1977), Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1976), and Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) for the interpretation.
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If education is completely separable from ability (i.e., Φne = 0, so that ρne = 0),
education should be subsidized on a net basis as long as education and labor effort are
complementary (i.e., Φle > 0 and ρle > 0). A subsidy on education then acts as an
implicit tax on leisure because a higher level of learning makes leisure less attractive.
Hence, an education subsidy offsets the distortionary impact of a redistributive labor
tax on leisure demand. If higher levels of education would result in lower labor effort
(i.e., Φle < 0 and ρle < 0), in contrast, education should be optimally taxed, so as to
impose an implicit tax on leisure. Empirical evidence suggests that education and labor
effort are complementary (so that Φle > 0 and ρle > 0) because better skilled workers
typically feature higher participation rates, work more, and retire later than low-skilled
agents do. Hence, education should be subsidized if education and ability are separable in
human-capital formation (i.e., Φne = 0). In the general case in which ρne and ρnl take on
arbitrary values, net education subsidies can be either positive or negative. Positive net
subsidies on education are optimal if the efficiency gains of education subsidies brought
about by boosting labor supply dominate the regressive distributional impact of education
subsidies, and vice versa.
For education policies not to be employed in an optimal redistributive program, the
incentive compatibility constraint (see equation (7)) reveals that Φn(n,ln,en)
Φl(n,ln,en)
should not
depend on education so that ∂ ln(Φn/Φl)
∂ ln en
= 0. This condition implies that the earnings
function should have the following weakly separable form
Φ(n, ln, en) ≡ φ(ψ(n, ln), en). (12)
With this earnings function, the partial elasticities of complementarity are ρne = ρle =
ΦψeΦ
ΦψΦe
and education policies do not relax the incentive compatibility constraint because
the benefits of education subsidies in terms of fewer labor supply distortions exactly offset
the distributional losses on account of the regressive incidence of education subsidies.
Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) assume a weakly separable earnings function zn ≡ nlnφ(en).
With this earnings function, ρne = ρle = 1, so that the efficiency gains from education
subsidies on labor supply exactly offset the equity losses due to regressive education
subsidies.10
Maldonado (2007) analyzes a special case of our general earnings function in which
education and ability are weakly separable from labor effort: zn ≡ φ(n, en)ln. With this
particular earnings function, we have ρne =
φneφ
φnφe
and ρle = 1. Consequently, education is
taxed (subsidized) on a net basis if φneφ
φnφe
> (<)1.
4 Optimal linear policies
This section derives optimal linear policies. Informational requirements are thus less
stringent. In particular, the government needs to be able to verify only aggregate labor
10The result of a zero net tax on human capital is in the same spirit as the optimal zero commodity
result by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). From a purely technical point of view, both results require some
form of weak separability: either in the earnings function (between education and the other arguments)
or in the utility function (between labor and consumption goods). However, our finding stresses the
trade-off between the direct gain of net education taxes in reducing inequality across skills and the loss
of these taxes in exacerbating tax distortions on labor. The intuition behind Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976),
in contrast, relies primarily on the impact of commodity taxes on the labor-tax distortion rather than
the direct effect on inequality across various skill levels.
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income and aggregate investment in education. The household problem is the same
as in the previous section except that the lump-sum transfer g enters the household
budget constraint and the linear tax t and the linear subsidy s replace their non-linear
counterparts in the first-order conditions.
The government budget constraint is given by
t
∫ n
n
Φ(n, ln, en)dF (n) = s
∫ n
n
endF (n) + g + E. (13)
The government maximizes a concave sum of individuals’ indirect utility functions,
which are denoted by υ(g, t, s, n). Roy’s lemma yields ∂υ
∂g
= ηn,
∂υ
∂t
= −ηnΦ(.), and
∂υ
∂s
= ηnen, where ηn stands for private marginal utility of income of skill n. We define
the social marginal value of income of skill n (including the income effects on the tax
base) as
bn ≡ Ψ
′ (υ (.)) ηn
λ
+
(
t− s
1− t
)
∂en
∂g
+ tΦl (.)
∂ln
∂g
, (14)
where λ represents again the shadow value of public resources, t−s
1−t stands for the marginal
tax wedge on human capital investment (cf. Bovenberg and Jacobs, 2005), and, similarly,
tΦl (.) is the marginal tax wedge on labor effort.
The Lagrangian for maximizing social welfare amounts to
max
{g,t,s}
L =
∫ n
n
Ψ(υ(g, t, s, n)) dF (n) + λ
∫ n
n
(tΦ(n, ln, en)− sen − g − E) dF (n). (15)
Using the definition of bn and Roy’s lemma, we can write the first-order condition for
maximizing social welfare with respect to g as
b¯ ≡
∫ n
n
bndF (n) = 1. (16)
The marginal social benefits of a higher lump-sum transfer (the left-hand side) should
equal the marginal social cost of a higher lump-sum transfer (right-hand side).
In order to facilitate the discussion on the optimal tax and subsidy rates, we introduce
the distributional characteristic ξ of labor income, which is given by the normalized
covariance between gross earnings zn and the social welfare weights bn:
ξ ≡ −
∫ n
n
bnzndF (n)−
∫ n
n
zndF (n)
∫ n
n
bndF (n)∫ n
n
zndF (n)
∫ n
n
bndF (n)
=
∫ n
n
(1− bn)zndF (n)∫ n
n
zndF (n)
. (17)
Similarly, the distributional characteristic of education ζ is given by
ζ ≡ −
∫ n
n
bnendF (n)−
∫ n
n
endF (n)
∫ n
n
bndF (n)∫ n
n
endF (n)
∫ n
n
bndF (n)
=
∫ n
n
(1− bn)endF (n)∫ n
n
endF (n)
. (18)
The second equality of both expressions is valid only at the optimized lump-sum transfer
so that (16) holds. A larger ξ (ζ) implies that the government wishes to use taxes on
earnings (education) for redistributional reasons, due to the negative correlation between
welfare weights and incomes (education). ξ (ζ) is zero if zn (en) is the same for all agents
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so that inequality is absent or if the government does not care about inequality and thus
attaches the same social welfare weight bn to all skills.
If the government sets the optimal education subsidy s alongside the optimal labor-
income tax t, we obtain the following expression for the net optimal net tax on education
(see appendix)
(t− s)
(1− s)(1− t) = ξ
(
ωe εlt
εes εlt − εet εls
)(
ζ
ξ
− εls
ωe εlt
)
, (19)
The compensated elasticities are defined as εet ≡ −ωe ∂en∂t 1−ten , εlt ≡ −ωl ∂ln∂t 1−tln , εes ≡
ωe
∂en
∂s
1−s
en
, εls ≡ ωl ∂ln∂s 1−sln . To save on notation, we have pre-multiplied the standard
elasticities with the earnings shares of labor and education (i.e. ωl ≡ ΦllnΦ , and ωe ≡ ΦeenΦ ).
A bar denotes an income-weighted average of a compensated elasticity (i.e.
εxi ≡
(∫ n
n
εxizndF (n)
)(∫ n
n
zndF (n)
)−1
for x = l, e, i = t, s). Similarly,
ωe ≡
(∫ n
n
ωezndF (n)
)(∫ n
n
zndF (n)
)−1
is the income-weighted average earnings share of
education.
ξ is the analogue of the marginal value of redistribution θn in the expression for the
non-linear income tax (11). Furthermore, ζ/ξ is closely related to the Hicks partial elas-
ticity of complementarity between education and skill ρne. In particular, ζ/ξ measures
the distributional advantage of education taxes over income taxes. Similarly, εls
ωe εlt
cor-
responds to the ρle term in the expression for the optimal non-linear income tax. This
term measures the benefits of education subsidies to lower the tax wedge on labor supply.
We can derive the elasticities in terms of the compensated wage elasticity of labor
supply and the properties of the earnings function and find that εlt = (ρee + ρel)/∆ > 0,
εet =
(
1
εωl
+ ρll + ρel
)
/∆ > 0, εls = ρel/∆ ≥ 0, and εes =
(
1
εωl
+ ρll
)
/∆ > 0 (see the
appendix). ρll ≡ −ΦllΦΦ2l > 0, and ρee ≡ −
ΦeeΦ
Φ2e
> 0 measure the concavity of the earnings
function with respect to labor and education, respectively. The second-order condition
of individual optimization implies that the denominator of all elasticities is positive: i.e.,
∆ ≡ ρee
(
1
εωl
+ ρll
)
− ρ2el > 0. ε ≡ ∂ln∂wn wnln stands for the compensated wage elasticity of
labor supply, where wn ≡ (1− t)Φl(n, ln, en) represents the net marginal wage rate.
Substitution of the elasticities in the expression for the optimal education tax yields
(t− s)
(1− s)(1− t) = ξ
(
ρee + ρel
∆
)
κωe
(
ζ
ξ
− 1
ωe
(
ρel
∆
)(
ρee+ρel
∆
)) , (20)
where κ−1 ≡
(
1
εωl
+ρll
∆
) (
ρee
∆
) − (ρel
∆
)2
> 0 is also positive. Note that κ ≈ 1, if the
covariances of the elasticities with income are small and individual elasticities correspond
closely to their aggregate counterparts, since ∆ ≡ ρee
(
1
εωl
+ ρll
)
− ρ2el.
If education and labor are not complementary (ρel = 0), the cross-elasticity of labor
supply with respect to the education subsidy is zero (εls = 0). Education should then be
taxed for redistributive reasons if an ability bias in education implies that high ability
agents learn more (i.e. ζ > 0), so that net taxes on education yield distributional benefits,
cf.
(t− s)
(1− s)(1− t)
∣∣∣∣
ρel=0
=
ζωe
εes
> 0. (21)
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The government should employ taxes on education more aggressively if education re-
sponds less elastically to the tax on education (so that ε¯es is smaller)– ceteris paribus ζ.
This mirrors the findings for the optimal non-linear policies.
Furthermore, if an ability bias in education is absent or the government is not inter-
ested in redistribution, the distributional characteristic ζ is zero. In that case, education
should be subsidized for efficiency reasons if education and labor effort are complementary
(i.e. ρel > 0, so that εls > 0):
(t− s)
(1− s)(1− t)
∣∣∣∣
ζ=0
= −ξκ
(ρel
∆
)
< 0. (22)
The government wants to subsidize education in order to boost labor supply, thereby
alleviating the tax distortion t > 0 associated with redistribution towards those with
lower earnings (ξ > 0). Hence, also in this case the results are analogous to the case of
non-linear policies: the government employs education subsidies to alleviate labor-tax
distortions if ability and education are not positively correlated.
If education generates ability rents and is also complementary to labor effort, educa-
tion taxes yield both efficiency losses and distributional gains. Whether education should
be taxed on a net basis at the optimum depends on the attractiveness of education taxes
relative to income taxes as a redistributive instrument (as measured by ζ/ξ), versus
the effectiveness of education policies to fight labor market distortions as measured by
1
ωe
(
ρel
∆
) (
ρee+ρel
∆
)−1
. At high levels of ζ/ξ, net taxes on education are attractive to combat
inequality. If the elasticity of complementarity between learning and working ρel is large,
however, education should be taxed relatively lightly (subsidized heavily). Intuitively, in
the presence of a large elasticity of complementarity ρel, learning indirectly boosts labor
supply, thereby alleviating labor tax distortions on labor supply.
The condition ζ
ξ
≷ 1
ωe
(
ρel
∆
) (
ρee+ρel
∆
)−1
determines whether education should be taxed
or subsidized on a net basis. If ζ
ξ
= 1
ωe
(
ρel
∆
) (
ρee+ρel
∆
)−1
, we obtain a zero net tax
on human capital investments under optimal linear policies. For the class of weakly
separable earnings functions (ρel = ρen), we can derive a sufficient condition for which
this requirement is met. First, a constant elasticity of education in the earnings function
ensures that ωe =
1
1+ρee
, where the elasticity ρee is constant across agents. Moreover,
it implies that ζ/ξ = 1 because education and learning are linearly related. Finally, it
yields ρel = 1, since ωe ≡ ΦeenΦ is constant (i.e., ∂ωe∂ln = enΦeΦlΦ2 (ρle − 1) = 0). Therefore,
the earnings function should be of the following weakly separable form:
Φ(n, ln, en) ≡ ψ(n, ln)eβn. (23)
Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) assumed that the earnings function was zn ≡ nlneβn.
This specification exactly meets the requirements for a zero net tax on education. The
intuition for their result is that labor earnings and education are related in a linear
fashion across different ability levels if the earnings function is weakly separable and
features a constant elasticity in education (cf. the first-order condition for education
(4)). Compared to labor income taxes, education taxes therefore imply both the same
distortions on labor supply (i.e. εlt =
εls
ωe
) and the same effects on the income distribution
(i.e. ζ = ξ). In contrast to labor taxes, however, taxes on education distort the education
decision. Consequently, the government does not employ net taxes on education and only
adopts a positive labor tax. The labor tax yields the same distributional benefits and
9
imposes the same tax-distortions on labor as the education tax, but avoids distortions in
skill formation.11
5 Conclusions
This paper has generalized Bovenberg and Jacobs’ (2005) models of optimal linear and
non-linear taxes and education subsidies in models of labor supply and human capital for-
mation. Using general earnings functions, we show that education decisions are generally
not efficient. Efficiency in human capital formation is obtained only under restrictive con-
ditions. In particular, with non-linear policy instruments, the earnings function should
be weakly separable in ability and labor, on the one hand, and in education, on the other
hand. With linear policy instruments, a weakly separable earnings function should in
addition feature a constant elasticity in education to arrive at a zero net tax on human
capital. The analysis of linear and non-linear tax and education policies reveals that
(net) subsidies on education are optimal only if sufficiently large efficiency gains of lower
labor supply distortions due to complementarities between learning and working offset
the regressive incidence of education subsidies.
Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) argued that their efficiency results are due to the Dia-
mond and Mirrlees (1971) production efficiency theorem applied to individual production
functions for human capital. This interpretation can be amended if more general earnings
functions are employed. Indeed, the applicability of the production efficiency theorem to
human capital production crucially depends on the presence of a non-distorting profit tax
to skim off the quasi-rents from ability in human capital returns. These rents arise due
to diminishing returns in human capital formation. A perfect profit tax is available with
the earnings functions used by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005). By combining a labor in-
come tax with an education subsidy, the government can perfectly extract the rents from
ability in human capital production, without directly interfering with the consumption
choices of households. However, this optimal education-tax policy package fails to consti-
tute a perfect profit tax on education rents from ability in the presence of more general
earnings functions. In fact, in the absence of weak separability, the government cannot
tax away the inframarginal ability rents in human capital production at zero efficiency
costs because consumption and investment choices are not separable. Consequently, the
production efficiency theorem breaks down, and education may be taxed or subsidized
for redistributive reasons, depending on the degree of complementarity of education and
labor effort and the incidence of education subsidies.
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Appendix
Optimal non-linear policies
We solve for the optimal allocation by applying the maximum principle and setting up a
Hamiltonian H, with ln and en as control variables, un as state variable, and θn as costate
variable for the incentive-compatibility constraint (7):
max
{ln,en,un}
H = Ψ(un)f(n) + θnul(cn, ln)Ξ(n, ln, en) + λ (Φ(n, ln, en)− en − cn − E) f(n),
(24)
where Ξ(n, ln, en) ≡ Φn(n,ln,en)Φl(n,ln,en) and λ represents the shadow value of the resource con-
straint. The transversality conditions are given by
lim
n→n
θn = 0, lim
n→n
θn = 0. (25)
The first-order condition for en is given by
∂H
∂en
= λ
(
Φe − 1− dcn
den
∣∣∣∣
u¯,l¯
)
f(n) + θnΞulc
dcn
den
∣∣∣∣
u¯,l¯
+ θnulΞe = 0. (26)
For the indirect impacts on consumption, we find dcn
den
∣∣∣
u¯,l¯
= 0 by differentiating the house-
hold budget constraint and substituting the individuals’ first-order condition for en. Sub-
stitution of dcn
den
∣∣∣
u¯,l¯
= 0, the first-order condition for learning 1 − S ′ = (1 − T ′)Φe, the
first-order condition for labor supply −ul = (1− T ′)Φluc and Ξe = ΦneΦl−ΦleΦn(Φl)2 gives
(T ′ − S ′)
(1− T ′)(1− S ′) =
θnuc/λ
nf(n)
nΦl
Φe
(
ΦneΦl − ΦleΦn
(Φl)
2
)
, (27)
which yields (11).
The first-order condition for ln is given by
∂H
∂ln
= λ
(
Φl − dcn
dln
∣∣∣∣
u¯,e¯
)
f(n) + θnΞ
(
ull + ulc
dcn
dln
∣∣∣∣
u¯,e¯
)
+ θnulΞl = 0, (28)
next we substitute dcn
dln
∣∣∣
u¯,e¯
= (1− T ′)Φl(n, ln, en) (found by taking the total derivative of
utility u(cn, ln) and substituting the first-order condition for labor supply to eliminate
ul), and Ξl =
ΦnlΦl−ΦllΦn
(Φl)
2 to arrive at
T ′
1− T ′ =
θnuc/λ
f(n)
(
ΦnlΦl − ΦllΦn
Φ2l
+
Φn
Φl
(
ull
ul
− ulc
uc
))
. (29)
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Rearranging gives
T ′
1− T ′ =
ucθn/λ
nf(n)
ωn
(
ρnl +
1
ωl
1
ε∗
)
, (30)
where ρnl ≡ ΦnlΦΦnΦl is Hicks’ partial elasticity of complementarity between ability and work
effort in earnings. ε∗ ≡
(
ullln
ul
− ulcln
uc
− Φllln
Φl
)−1
> 0 is a measure for the compensated
wage elasticity of labor supply, which depends on the the curvature of both the utility
function and the earnings function. As before, we also find here that marginal taxes
increase if ability rents increase with labor effort (ρnl is higher). If the earnings function
is linear in ability and labor (ωn = ωl = ρnl = 1), the expression found by Mirrlees (1971)
results.12
The first-order condition for un is
∂H
∂un
=
(
Ψ′(un)− λ dcn
dun
∣∣∣∣
l¯,e¯
)
f(n) + θnΞulc
dcn
dun
∣∣∣∣
l¯,e¯
=
dθn
dn
. (31)
We defined θn negatively; hence, there is no minus sign on the right-hand side. Substi-
tution of dcn
dun
∣∣∣
l¯,e¯
= 1
uc
and some rearranging yield a first-order differential equation in
θn
dθn
dn
+ δnθn = κn, (32)
where δn ≡ −ΦnΦl
ulc
uc
and κn ≡
(
Ψ′(un)− λuc
)
f(n). This equation can be solved analyti-
cally to find
θn
λ
=
∫ n
n
(
1
uc (.)
− Ψ
′(um)
λ
)
exp
(∫ n
m
−Φs (.)
Φl (.)
ulc (.)
uc (.)
ds
)
f(m)dm. (33)
See Mirrlees (1971), Seade (1977), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), and Bovenberg and
Jacobs (2005) for the interpretation.
Optimal linear policies
The Lagrangian for maximizing social welfare is designated by
max
{g,t,s}
L =
∫ n
n
Ψ(υ(g, t, s, n)) dF (n) + λ
∫ n
n
(tΦ(n, ln, en)− sen − g − E) dF (n). (34)
The first-order conditions for maximization of social welfare (34) with respect to t
and s are
∂L
∂t
=
∫ n
n
[
(−Ψ′ (υn) ηn + λ) Φ(.) + λ
(
tΦl(.)
∂ln
∂t
+
(t− s)
(1− t)
∂en
∂t
)]
dF (n) = 0, (35)
∂L
∂s
=
∫ n
n
[
(Ψ′ (υn) ηn − λ) en + λ
(
tΦl(.)
∂ln
∂s
+
(t− s)
(1− t)
∂en
∂s
)]
dF (n) = 0, (36)
12We note here that the elasticities of gross income with respect to the marginal tax rates are higher
than in the case where human capital formation is exogenous. Optimal marginal income taxes are
consequently lower. In order to show this, one needs to write the optimal tax formula in terms of the
density of gross earnings. See Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005).
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where we used the first-order condition for learning and Roy’s lemma.
The first-order condition for t can be simplified upon substitution of the Slutsky
equations ∂ln
∂t
= ∂l
∗
n
∂t
− Φ (.) ∂ln
∂g
and ∂en
∂t
= ∂e
∗
n
∂t
− Φ (.) ∂en
∂g
(asterisks denote compensated
demands) and the definition of bn from (14)∫ n
n
[
(1− bn) Φ(.) + t
1− tΦl(.)ln
∂l∗n
∂t
1− t
ln
+
(t− s)en
(1− t)2
∂e∗n
∂t
1− t
en
]
dF (n) = 0. (37)
Next, use the first-order condition for learning to establish ωe(1−t)Φ(n, ln, en) = (1−s)en,
where ωe ≡ ΦeenΦ , and simplify∫ n
n
[
(1− bn) Φ(.)− t
1− tεltΦ (.) +
(t− s)
(1− t)(1− s)εetΦ (.)
]
dF (n) = 0, (38)
εlt ≡ −ωl ∂l∗n∂t 1−tln > 0, and εet ≡ −ωe
∂e∗n
∂t
1−t
en
> 0. Next divide by
∫ n
n
Φ(n, ln, en)dF (n) to
get
ξ − t
1− tεlt −
(t− s)
(1− s)(1− t)εet = 0, (39)
where a bar denotes a weighted average elasticity with income as weights, i.e.,
εxt ≡
(∫ n
n
εxtzndF (n)
)(∫ n
n
zndF (n)
)−1
for x = l, e.
Similarly, we can simplify the first-order condition for s upon substitution of the
Slutsky equations ∂ln
∂s
= ∂l
∗
n
∂s
+ en
∂ln
∂g
and ∂en
∂t
= ∂e
∗
n
∂s
+ en
∂en
∂g
and the definition of bn from
(14)∫ n
n
[
(bn − 1) en + t
1− sΦl(.)ln
∂l∗n
∂s
1− s
ln
+
(t− s)en
(1− t)(1− s)
∂e∗n
∂s
1− s
en
]
dF (n) = 0. (40)
Next, use ωe(1− t)Φ(n, ln, en) = (1− s)en, and simplify∫ n
n
[
(bn − 1) en + t
1− sεlsΦ (.) +
(t− s)
(1− s)2 εesΦ(.)
]
dF (n) = 0, (41)
εls ≡ ωl ∂l∗n∂s 1−sln > 0, and εes ≡ ωe
∂e∗n
∂s
1−s
en
> 0. Next divide by
∫ n
n
Φ(n, ln, en)dF (n) to get
−ζ
∫ n
n
endF (n)∫ n
n
zndF (n)
+
t
1− sεls +
(t− s)
(1− s)2 εes = 0. (42)
Again, use the first-order condition for learning to find
ζ − t
1− t
εls
ωe
− (t− s)
(1− s)(1− t)
εes
ωe
= 0, (43)
where εxs ≡
(∫ n
n
εxszndF (n)
)(∫ n
n
zndF (n)
)−1
x = l, e and
ωe ≡
(∫ n
n
ωezndF (n)
)(∫ n
n
zndF (n)
)−1
.
The optimal net tax on education follows by solving the first-order condition for t (39)
and the first-order condition for s (43) for (t−s)
(1−s)(1−t) and
t
1−t . The optimal expression for
(t−s)
(1−s)(1−t) is given in the text. The optimal linear income tax is
t
1− t = ξ
(
ωe εet
εes εlt − εet εls
)(
εes
ωe εet
− ζ
ξ
)
. (44)
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Compensated elasticities
To derive compensated elasticities, we keep utility fixed. Hence, in totally differentiated
form, utility can be written as
c˜n =
γl
γc
l˜n, (45)
where γl ≡ −ullnu > 0 and γc ≡ uccnu > 0 are the shares of labor and labor in utility,
respectively. A tilde denotes a log-linear deviation, e.g. c˜n ≡ dcn/cn.The first-order
condition for labor supply (see equation (5)) can also be totally differentiated to find
(µll − µcl) l˜n + (µcc − µlc) c˜n = −t˜− αll l˜n + αlee˜n, (46)
where µcc ≡ −ucccnuc > 0, µll ≡ −ulllnul > 0, µcl ≡
uclln
uc
≷ 0, µlc ≡ ullnul ≷ 0, αll ≡ −
Φllln
Φl
≥ 0,
αle ≡ ΦleenΦl ≷ 0, and the linearized tax and subsidy rates are defined as t˜ ≡ dt/(1 − t)
and s˜ ≡ ds/(1− s).
Using the linearized utility function to substitute out c˜ gives
l˜n = ε
(
−t˜− αll l˜n + αlee˜n
)
, (47)
where ε−1 ≡ µll − µcl + (µcc − µlc) γlγc > 0 from the second-order conditions. ε = ∂ln∂wn wnln
can be interpreted as the compensated wage elasticity of labor supply, where wn ≡
(1−t)Φl(n, ln, en). In the special case that u (.) is homothetic, ε is related to the elasticity
of substitution between leisure and consumption (up to a share parameter).
Linearizing the first-order condition for education (see equation (4)) yields
−t˜− αeee˜n + αel l˜n = −s˜, (48)
where αee ≡ −ΦeeenΦe > 0 and αel ≡ ΦellnΦe ≷ 0.
The last two equations can be solved for l˜n and e˜n so as to find
l˜n = −ε (αee + αle)
Ω
t˜+
εαle
Ω
s˜, (49)
e˜n = −1 + ε (αll + αel)
Ω
t˜+
(1 + εαll)
Ω
s˜, (50)
where Ω ≡ αee (1 + εαll)− εαelαle > 0 from the second-order conditions for utility maxi-
mization.
We can rewrite the last expressions, by defining ρee ≡ −ΦeeΦΦ2e > 0, and ρll ≡ −
ΦllΦ
Φ2l
>
0, as measures for the concavity of the earnings function with respect to learning and
labor effort, and using the elasticity of complementarity between learning and working
ρel ≡ ΦelΦΦeΦl to obtain αee ≡ −ΦeeenΦe = ωeρee, αel ≡
Φelln
Φe
= ωlρel, αle ≡ ΦleenΦl = ωeρel, and
αll ≡ −ΦlllnΦl = ωlρll, where ωl ≡
Φlln
Φ
and ωe ≡ ΦeenΦ .
Similarly, Ω can be rewritten to find
Ω = ωlωeε
(
ρee
(
1
εωl
+ ρll
)
− ρ2el
)
> 0. (51)
Hence, the second-order condition can be written as ρee
(
1
εωl
+ ρll
)
> ρ2el. Consequently,
the feedback between learning and working in the earnings function, as measured by
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ρel, should be sufficiently small so as to guarantee that second-order conditions are met.
Indeed, when there is no feedback (ρel = 0) second-order conditions are always satisfied.
Substitution of the α terms and ∆ in the expressions for l˜n and e˜n gives
ωl l˜n = − ρee + ρel
ρee
(
1
εωl
+ ρll
)
− ρ2el
t˜+
ρel
ρee
(
1
εωl
+ ρll
)
− ρ2el
s˜, (52)
ωee˜n = −
1
εωl
+ ρll + ρel
ρee
(
1
εωl
+ ρll
)
− ρ2el
t˜+
1
εωl
+ ρll
ρee
(
1
εωl
+ ρll
)
− ρ2el
s˜. (53)
The elasticities of labor supply and human capital investment with respect to the
policy parameters t and s can, therefore, be written as
εlt ≡ −ωl∂ln
∂t
1− t
ln
=
ρee + ρel
ρee
(
1
εωl
+ ρll
)
− ρ2el
, (54)
εet ≡ −ωe∂en
∂t
1− t
en
=
1
εωl
+ ρll + ρel
ρee
(
1
εωl
+ ρll
)
− ρ2el
, (55)
εls ≡ ωl∂ln
∂s
1− s
ln
=
ρel
ρee
(
1
εωl
+ ρll
)
− ρ2el
, (56)
εes ≡ ωe∂en
∂s
1− s
en
=
1
εωl
+ ρll
ρee
(
1
εωl
+ ρll
)
− ρ2el
. (57)
Note that all the elasticities increase with the elasticity of complementarity ρel.
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